Abstract Increasingly, governments are using contracts as a means of achieving accountability for public resources directed towards community organisations. This paper compares contractual arrangements between community organisations and governments in British Columbia, Queeensland, and New Zealand. The paper examines the extent to which these contracts are able to measure performance. These contracts are also examined with respect to the power relationships between government and community organisations. The paper concludes that performance measurement may rest on establishing an appropriate``value'' framework, and that autonomy of community organisations from government may vary according to broader objectives within policy areas.
Increasingly, governments across the world are using purchase of service contracts as a means of delivering public goods. Growth in service delivery contracts emerges from a belief that public services contracted to the private sector results in improved efficiency and effectiveness (Bingman, 1997) and a desire to achieve greater accountability for public funds directed to community organisations (Else et al., 1992; Hanly, 1995) . This paper compares service agreements in Australia, Canada and New Zealand, as a way of examining the extent to which these``contracts'' between government and community organisations overcome some of the theoretical obstacles associated with the contracting (for example, Ryan, 1995; Quiggin, 1996; Prager, 1997) .
Contracting community services
The literature dealing with contracts between government and voluntary organisations often addresses two problems associated with contractual arrangements between these two parties. First, there are continual problems associated with developing appropriate performance measures which might provide an insight into the outcomes achieved by community organisations. In particular, evaluation of human services has tended to focus on process measures which relate to the mechanics of service delivery and can be defined more easily than service performance (Kettner and Martin, 1993) . Performance measurement has tended to focus on relatively easy to define outputs such as the volume of service, to more complex end-products such as client impact and effectiveness (Kettner and Martin, 1993; Nolan and Grant, 1993) , and has tended to be``crude, unreliable, spurious and meaningless'' (Flynn et al., 1995, p. 535) .
Thus, the performance indicators used to measure the effectiveness of contracts are often inconsistent with assessing outcomes, especially with respect to evaluating the quality of services (Kendrick, 1992) . This literature sometimes concludes with suggestions for more complex evaluation (for example, Grasso and Epstein, 1992; Mowbray and Luke, 1996) . In some cases authors propose more radical frameworks for evaluating performance (for example, Flynn et al., 1995; Phillips, 1996) .
The comparison of performance measurement in this paper will test the extent to which agencies attempt to assess outcomes rather than activity. This comparison offers the prospect of making some preliminary assessment of best practice, or making some conclusions regarding the prospects for measuring outcomes.
Second, service contracts establish a power relationship between government and community organisations. The nature of this power relationship will vary according to size of community organisations, the political sensitivity of services being delivered and the number of competitors able to provide a service (Ryan, 1997) . Sometimes governments become dependent on a small number of service providers (Malka, 1990; Kramer, 1994) which strengthens the bargaining position of these organisations. In other instances, small organisations become vulnerable to complex institutional, administrative and legal arrangements (Reilly, 1993; Kendrick, 1989) .
Here, the literature suggests that contracts have tended to reinforce the position of large community organisations, and diminish the position of smaller organisations. For example, Ernst & Young's (1996) study of the New Zealand Community Funding Agency found that there was a clear concentration of public resources in favour of large community organisations, with 5 per cent of the contracts written by the agency accounting for 63 per cent of total funds committed to contract services. Furthermore, contracts over $500,000 accounted for 51 per cent of total expenditure. The task undertaken in this paper attempts to identify the ways in which contract processes define a power relationship between government and community organisations.
For example, power relationships might be asserted by provisions applying to the termination of contracts, grievance procedures, legal liabilities and the ownership of property. These arrangements identify the extent to which community organisations have access to fair administrative process and are able control the delivery of services. Other literature expresses concern over the extent to which competitive contracting incorporates community organisations into the state (Hudson, 1993; Kramer, 1994) .
Methodological issues
The following analysis is based on an examination of service agreements and contracts in three jurisdictions: British Columbia (Canada), Queensland (Australia), and New Zealand. In Australia and New Zealand, arrangements between community organisations and governments are referred to as service agreements. In Canada, they are contracts. In some instances, interviews with
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The contracts from British Columbia used in this comparison were:
(1) crisis accommodation support for families threatened by violence, provided by the Ministry of Women's Equality; and (2) an employment support program for mentally and physically handicapped, funded through the Ministry of Health.
The service agreements examined in Queensland are as follows:
(1) preventative and crisis intervention for families and individuals suffering socially structured stress, funded by the Queensland Family Individual Support Program; and (2) accommodation services provided through the Supported Accommodation Assistance Program (joint federal and state government funding).
The service agreements from New Zealand relate to the following services:
(1) counselling, residential care and parenting support services funded by the New Zealand Community Funding Agency; and (2) drug and alcohol rehabilitation services funded by a Regional Health Authority.
The extent to which these contracts and agreements are representative varies according to the issue being tested, and the jurisdiction. With respect to power relationships between government and community organisations, the legal provisions relating to termination, ownership and grievance appear to be standard to contracts and service agreements written throughout the jurisdictions being compared. Contracts and service agreements are dated as 1996 or 1997. Interviews with public officials and community representatives suggest that the extent to which contracts and agreements attempt to measure performance varies considerably across portfolios within these jurisdictions. New Zealand appears to be most consistent in this respect, as a consequence of its longerterm commitment to managerial management practices. Thus, the New Zealand services agreements examined in this paper are probably representative of the norm in this jurisdiction. Attempts to define performance measurement is much more uneven in British Columbia and Queensland. The contracts and service agreements examined with respect to British Columbia and Queensland represent one case of best practice, and one case of an attempt at placing a greater emphasis on performance measurement in each jurisdiction.
Performance measurement
Tables I to VI summarise the performance measures identified in the contracts under review. They provide evidence of considerable differences in the performance measurement of agencies. The New Zealand service agreements examined are the most sophisticated with respect to providing quantitative measures of performance. If these contracts are considered in conjunction with the detailed quality standards developed in this jurisdiction (Community Funding Agency, 1995a) , it would appear that New Zealand has developed the most transparent measures of performance.
The contracts written by the Province of British Columbia make very little attempt to identify measurable performance indicators, although the government has embarked on a program of reforming the nature, transparency and accountability of its contracts (for example, see Ministry for Children and Families, 1997a). The province has given considerable recent attention to developing performance measures and performance measurement frameworks, especially in the delivery of human services (Ministry for Children and Families, 1997b; Ministry for Multiculturalism and Immigration, 1997). However, these measure are not yet reflected in contracts written between government and community organisations.
In Queensland, the main focus of contracts is on financial reporting, although there are clear attempts to provide some measure of activity. Here, the government has allowed organisations to develop their own performance measures as part of an incremental movement towards program evaluation. Accordingly, organisations have tended to provide performance measures which are easy to collect, or are kept as part of the normal administration of organisations. Tables III and IV indicate that performance measures in Queensland are simple numeric counts of activity, with surveys of client satisfaction being the only attempt to measure the quality of programs. There is no attempt to measure post-delivery outcomes, nor the effectiveness of programs, although the organisation which entered into the agreement reported in Table IV had indicated that it undertook internal measures of quality such as pre-exit and post-exit interviews, and user and volunteer focus groups.
The performance measures reported with respect to New Zealand contracts are the most comprehensive although they are still fundamentally measures of activity rather than effectiveness or outcomes (see Tables V and VI) . These measures need to be considered in conjunction with services standards which address issues such as the adequacy of physical resources, emotional, psychological, social, spiritual and cultural needs (Community Funding Agency, 1995a; 1995b 
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New Zealand has given considerable attention to developing performance measures but still has relied mostly on numerical counts of activity. As was the case with Queensland, client surveys are the only attempt to measure quality issues. The measures used in these contracts focus mostly on implementation processes, and provide little insight into post-delivery outcomes.
The evidence presented here suggests that agencies in British Columbia, Queensland and New Zealand do not incorporate, in contracts and service agreements, performance measures beyond simple numerical counts of activity. On the basis of this comparison, it is probably reasonable to conclude that service agreements in New Zealand are the most comprehensive but there is still the question of whether the range of information required in these contracts assists policy makers and the public understand the effectiveness of these programs.
It may be the case that measurement of outcomes and effectiveness are beyond the resources or technical expertise of organisations, and funding agencies appreciate the limits of measurement. Best practices might be interpreted with respect to the capacity of funding agencies to achieve optimal outcomes, with the measurement of outcomes being a lesser consideration. In a climate of diminishing resources in the community services sector, funding agencies and community organisations will prefer to focus on the delivery of services rather than on expensive evaluations of effectiveness.
In this light, the contracts examined in this paper might be reassessed with respect to best practice. The contract written by the Ministry of Women's Equality in British Columbia, and the service standards developed in New Zealand provide some insight into an alternative approach to agreements between government and community organisations. The Ministry of Women's Equality contract develops a framework and general principles and guidelines rather than specific indicators of performance. For example, this contract focuses on issues such approaches to counselling, the experience of staff, access, power relationships, emotional support and environment being created.
Here, the emphasis is on providing a context and approach to service delivery, issues which are likely to be more important to the quality of service delivery than measures of activity. Although interpretation of these principles and guidelines might be open to dispute on the margin, they provide a clearer framework for understanding the requirements of the agency with respect to the``whole'' of service delivery. This contract raises the prospect that it may be more effective to define performance with respect to an approac and a set of principles rather than attempting to quantify performance. The issues of unsatisfactory performance may still need to be addressed.
Similarly, service standards developed in New Zealand are vague on detail but convey an approach to services delivery such as the following statement on priorities with respect to child and family support services:
All services or programs reflect the principle that the welfare and interests of the child or young person shall be the first and paramount consideration (Community Funding Agency, 1995a, p. 16). Statements identifying an approach and a set of principles have the additional advantage of accommodating innovation and experimentation. Again, New Zealand's services standards require agencies to``have a process for intake'' or`h ave a process for investigating and assessing referrals'', rather than attempt to stipulate the detail of these requirements. Thus, best practice might be to identify a policy, a context, values or a framework rather than attempting to define the detail.
Power relationships
Contracts and services agreements construct power relationships in the way they design termination provisions, grievance procedures, ownership and liability. Termination provides some insight into the avenues available to government agencies and organisations with respect to ending agreements. Interviews with some community service representatives indicated that government agencies have considerable legal provisions for terminating contracts without any prospect of independent arbitration or compensation. These problems lead to the issue of the grievance procedures which might apply to disputes between government agencies and community organisations. These processes provide further insight into the relative power of these parties in dispute.
Finally, community service organisations have considered the legal responsibilities associated with contracts and services agreements to be imbalanced in circumstances where ownership of assets and intellectual property reside with the funding agency (for example, see Ryan, 1997) . Contracts and services agreements in British Columbia, Queensland and New Zealand are compared with respect to power relationships defined by these provisions.
Termination and grievance procedures
Termination is a standard clause in contracts between the government of British Columbia and community organisations. The province has at its sole discretion the power to terminate the contract without cause on 60 days written notice. The province is required to pay the contractor for that part of the contract which has been completed to the satisfaction of the government.
Disputes with respect to contracts are arbitrated by the British Columbia International Arbitration Centre. Importantly, termination of the contract is subject to the dispute resolution processes of this centre, although there are 14 other clauses of the contract identified as being exempt from the arbitration of this authority.
The issue of termination is not addressed in the Queensland service agreements examined in this research. Queensland service agreements have the appearance of empowering community groups to a greater extent than contracts written by the government in British Columbia. The language tends to be less direct and demanding with respect to the responsibilities of Comparison of contracting arrangements 99 community organisations. This is probably a result of service agreements being written by community organisations and approved by the funding agency rather than the funding agency constructing the document.
However, the capacity of the state to terminate a service agreement is explicit in legislation governing the disbursement of funds to community organisations. This legislation allows the Minister to cancel a grant with 21 days notice, and even recover money as a debt owing to the Crown (Queensland Government, 1987) . Thus, power relationships are defined in legislation rather than service agreements.
Service agreements in Queensland make no mention of grievance procedures or processes. An attempt by one community organisation to include such procedures in a service agreement was rejected by the funding agency. Since legislation governs the disbursement of funds, the courts are the only form of arbitration available to community organisations. Draft dispute resolution guidelines were initiated by the relevant department in 1995 but these procedures have not been developed beyond this stage (Department of Families and Community Services, 1995) . Even these draft guidelines provided the departmental heads with the authority to overturn decisions of the independent review panel.
Termination provisions vary according to the funding agency in New Zealand. In one case, governing legislation provided the framework for withdrawal of funding but the other service agreement provided considerable detail of dispute resolution processes. This service agreement uses the Health Sector Mediation and Arbitration Rules (1993) as a basis for resolving conflict, and prohibits litigation during this process. The service agreement cannot be terminated during this arbitration process.
This New Zealand agreement seems to combine both processes and language with attempt to balance the rights and responsibilities of all parties entering into service delivery arrangements. A feature of this agreement is that it states that the funding agency must compensate the contractor for any losses incurred during resolution processes. Here, there is a clear attempt to identify the roles and responsibilities of both government and community organisations.
There are considerable differences between the extent to which service agreements and contracts reinforce power differences in the relationship between government and community organisations. On the basis of contracts examined in this paper, New Zealand appears to have attempted to provide community organisations with both statements of government responsibilities and processes for resolving disputes. British Columbia also provides dispute resolution processes but does not record expectations of funding agencies to the extent noted in the New Zealand regional health authority contract.
Liability and ownership
Similarly, the New Zealand health authority service agreement provides a clearer statement of mutual responsibility and ownership than agreements and IJPSM 12,2 100 contracts pertaining to Queensland and British Columbia. This service agreement makes provision for interest to be charged on late payment by the funding agency, at an interest rate 2 per cent above the corporate business lending rate and exempts community organisations from liabilities resulting from non-performance resulting from``events beyond your reasonable control''. The service agreement requires organisations to maintain appropriate insurances. This issue of ownership is not addressed in these New Zealand service agreements. However, the New Zealand approach is different in that it provides clear statements of responsibility for both parties, and exempts community organisations from unforeseen circumstances.
British Columbia contracts appear to have``whole-of-government'' standard provisions regarding ownership, liability and responsibility. In short, the province owns everything and community organisations accept all legal liabilities. The province owns any material produced, received or acquired by the contractor, and has exclusive copyright to any material produced. In addition, the contractor is required to indemnify the province, its employees and agents,``from and against any and all losses, claims damages, actions, causes of action, costs, and expenses the province may sustain ...'', if these liabilities are caused by actions of the contractor.
These contracts make very little mention of the responsibilities of the province. The exception is the requirement that the province maintain comprehensive general liability insurance against bodily injury, although even this clause of the contract is exempted if the insurance company cancels the insurance. The contractor is also required to maintain insurance.
The Queensland service agreements examined in this paper do not address issues such as ownership of intellectual property, assets and material, nor the issue of legal liability. One contract included special provisions which required the funding agency to participate in some of the support services being provided by the community organisation. However, the service contracts in Queensland are much less legalistic in their approach to liabilities and indemnities. Possibly the issue of ownership is central to the Queensland approach.
Queensland has tended to view government funding of community services as subsidising private charitable works rather than incorporating these organisations into the apparatus of the state (Ryan, 1997) . Unlike British Columbia, which requires acknowledgment of government participation in all advertising and promotional material, Queensland funding agencies remain relatively removed from the delivery of services. For community organisations, the advantage is that they have to remain comparatively autonomous. For Queensland society, the disadvantage is that the government views these services as private rather public responsibilities.
In relation to ownership and liabilities, British Columbia, Queensland and New Zealand provide three different models of a relationship between government and community organisations. The legal language of British Columbia contracts implies a model of public control over community
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organisations and ownership of programs. These contracts appear to construct a relationship where community organisations are sub-contracted to provide public services.
The New Zealand service agreements present a model which more closely approximates partnership, with documentation outlining the roles and responsibilities of both government and community organisations. These service agreements make an attempt at establishing some reasonable expectations regarding the rights of community organisations with respect to dealing with government.
Finally, the Queensland model is closer to government patronage of private works. Government makes few demands with respect to ownership and control but also accepts limited responsibility for service provision. This is a more traditional model of community service being disentangled from the state.
Discussion
This comparison of contracts and service agreements in British Columbia, Queensland and New Zealand provides some insights into best practice and emerging models of government-community organisation relationships.
One contract from British Columbia provided an interesting approach to performance management by establishing a context and a framework for performance measurement. This framework provides an expectation with respect to a set of values and outcomes which might be difficult to measure, but still provides an understanding of program delivery and performance. In many ways, this approach provides a clearer of understanding of expectations than counts of activities which may not be relevant to program objectives. However, some attention may need to be given to clarifying expectations and resolving disputes relating to contracts developed within this type of context. Best practice with respect to power relationships between government and community organisations will ultimately depend on the values which are considered to be most important. If autonomy from government is paramount, then Queensland provides a model where there are few expectations regarding dispute resolution, joint development of programs, identifying responsibilities, or the ownership of means and outcomes. If partnership is important, New Zealand probably provides the best model with its emphasis on mutual responsibility and arbitration. In Canada, there also appears to be a clearer focus on achieving a set of social objectives, with community organisations being instrumental to these public goals.
